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Abstract 
 
The rise in online social networking has brought about a revolution in social 
relations. However, its effects on offline interactions and its implications for 
collective well-being are still not clear and are under-investigated. We study 
the ecology of online and offline interaction in an evolutionary game 
framework where individuals can adopt different strategies of socialization. 
Our main result is that the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope 
with hostile social environments can lead the economy to non-socially 
optimal stationary states. 
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1. Introduction 
The advent of social networking sites (SNS)5has caused a striking transformation in the way 
people interact with each other and with the surrounding social, political, and institutional 
environment. Online networks such as Facebook allow users to preserve and develop their 
social relations despite time and distance constraints (Ellison et al., 2007). SNS also provide 
users with strategies to cope with conditions of social decay: when the offline environment is 
lacking in social participation opportunities, individuals can turn to the online world or 
establish new contacts and create new chances of offline interaction (Steinfield et al., 2008). 
Situations of decay, however, can affect even online networks. Descriptive statistics from the 
Pew Research Center (PRC) illustrate that “online incivility”, an important yet still under-
investigated phenomenon - including aggressive and disrespectful behaviors, vile comments, 
harassment, and hate speech - is spreading across SNS and makes online social environments 
potentially hostile for users (Rainie et al., 2012; Duggan, 2014). Recent studies suggest that 
exposure to online incivility may be detrimental to SNS users’ trust and well-being (Sarracino 
et al., 2015a; Sabatini et al., 2015).  
Despite the extent of the transformations brought about by online networking, existing 
research on the relationships between online and offline interactions is limited. We still lack 
models to analyse the evolution of the different strategies of social engagement in potentially 
hostile environments and how it impacts collective well-being. This issue has important 
societal and economic implications, as social interaction influences the formation of opinions, 
political participation, collective action, and consumption patterns. 
We study the ecology of online and offline social interaction in an evolutionary game 
framework where individuals can choose whether to be polite or not when meeting others in 
online environments. Everyone also has the option to isolate themselves from any social 
interaction, as a self-protective behavior to cope with hostile social environments. An offline 
environment can be hostile in relation to the decline in the opportunities for social 
engagement, due for example to increasing busyness and to the lack of meeting places such as 
parks, theatres, and associations. People may react by reducing face-to-face interaction, in 
order to develop part of their social life online, or even to seek refuge in social isolation, as 
suggested in Putnam’s (2000) study on the decline of the American community. An online 
social environment, on the other hand, can become hostile with the spread of online incivility, 
                                                
5 We use the terms social networking sites (SNS), online social networks and online networks as synonyms for 
the sake of brevity. 
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which makes Internet-mediated interaction less rewarding. Users may want to defend 
themselves from incivility in social networks by adopting an uncivil behavior in their turn, or 
by abandoning those networks. In this latter case, if face-to-face interactions are perceived as 
not rewarding enough, self-protective behaviors may lead to social isolation. 
We define four types of agents pursuing different social interaction strategies: 1) people who 
develop social relations by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. The distinctive trait of 
this type of agents is that they do not use SNS; 2) people who, in addition to face-to-face 
encounters, do use SNS and behave politely in online interactions; 3) SNS users who behave 
in an uncivil way in online interactions; 4) individuals who choose to withdraw from social 
relations. We define the equilibrium in which all individuals choose social isolation as a 
“social poverty trap” (Antoci et al., 2007; 2012a; 2015). 
We model a homogeneous population, where every individual has the same preferences and 
access to technologies, but they differ with respect to the adopted strategy. However, the 
fourth strategy can also be interpreted as a form of self-protective behavior, which emerges 
when the combined hostility of physical and virtual social environmentsprompts a drastic 
form of adaptation consisting in the withdrawal from any form of social interaction (offline or 
online) and the choice of social isolation.  
The analysis of dynamics shows that the spread of self-protective behaviors, as triggered by 
incivility and/or social poverty, entails undesirable results to the extent to which it leads the 
economy to non-socially optimal stationary states that are Pareto dominated by others. For 
individuals, self-protective behaviors are rational in that they temporarily provide higher 
payoffs. However, their spread causes a generalized decrease in the payoffs associated with 
each social participation strategy, which, in the long run, leads the economy to a non-optimal 
stationary state. The social poverty trap is always a locally attractive Nash equilibrium. When 
the other stationary states are attractive, they always give higher payoffs than the social 
poverty trap. 
Our contribution bridges two literatures. The first literature is that of economists and political 
scientists who empirically analyzed how Internet use may impact on aspects of social capital 
such as face-to-face interactions and well-being (e.g. Falck et al., 2012; Campante et al., 
2013; Helliwell and Huang, 2013; Bauernschuster et al., 2014). We contribute to this body of 
research by providing the first study of the possible evolution of various modes of offline and 
online interactions. In addition, we introduce the problem of online incivility and develop the 
first theoretical analysis of civility and incivility in online interactions.  
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Our focus on social poverty traps is also related to previous economic and sociological studies 
that analyzed how economic growth and technological progress may cause a decline in face-
to-face social interactions (Putnam, 2000; Antoci et al., 2007; 2012; 2013; Bartolini and 
Bonatti, 2008; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015), and to the literature concerning the ‘decline of 
community life thesis’ (Paxton, 1999, p. 88; Sarracino, 2010). 
The second body of literature is that of psychologists and computer scientists who have 
analyzed the impact of SNS use on social capital and well-being (e.g. Ellison et al., 2007; 
Steinfield et al., 2008; Kross et al., 2013).  
The paper begins by providing the motivation of the study and briefly reviewing the existing 
literature in sections 2, 3 and 4. We then illustrate the setup of the model. In section 6 we 
analyze the dynamics of the different forms of participation. Section 7 is devoted to a well-
being analysis. In Section 8 we conclude by discussing some possible interpretations and 
policy implications of the results. 
 
2. The decline in social engagement 
In his best seller Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam (2000) documented that a decline in 
measures of social capital – such as participation in formal organisations, informal social 
connectedness, and interpersonal trust – began in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, 
with a sharp acceleration in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Putnam’s ‘decline of community life thesis’ (Paxton, 1999, p. 88) prompted a number of 
subsequent empirical tests. Costa and Kahn (2003) used a number of different sources to 
assess the development of social capital in the United States since 1952. The authors found a 
decline in indicators of volunteering, membership of organisations and entertainment with 
friends and relatives. Based on GSS data, Bartolini et al. (2013) found a declining trend in 
indicators of social connectedness and confidence in institutions in the United States between 
1975 and 2002.  
Apart from the United States, there seems to be a common pattern of declining trust, social 
engagement and organisational activity across industrialised democracies starting from the 
1980s, with the exception of Scandinavian countries (Leigh, 2003; Listhaug and Grønflaten, 
2007). Declining trends of indicators of social interaction have been documented for England 
and Wales over the period 1972–99 (Li et al., 2003), Great Britain over 1959–90 (Hall, 2010) 
and 1980–2000 (Sarracino, 2010), China (Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015) and Australia over 
1960–90 (Cox, 2002).  
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Putnam (2000) discussed three main explanations for the decline in American social capital: 
1) the reduction in the time available for social interaction – related to the need to work more, 
to the rise in labour flexibility and to the increase in commuting time in urban areas; 2) the 
rise in mobility of workers and students; and 3) technology and mass media.  
In the last decade, Putnam’s arguments have found support in a number of studies 
investigating the effect exerted on various dimensions of social connectedness by the rise in 
working time (Bartolini and Bilancini, 2011), labour mobility (Routledge and von Ambsberg, 
2003), urban sprawl and commuting (Besser et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2001), and the 
impoverishment of the social environment, which can prompt individuals to pursue isolation 
(Bartolini and Bonatti, 2003; Antoci et al., 2007).  
Antoci et al. (2012a; 2013) modelled the decline in social engagement as the result of a self-
protective reaction to the reduction in the time available for social activities, the decline in 
social participation opportunities and the rise of materialistic values. According to the authors, 
the need to “defend” oneself from an unfriendly environment where social engagement 
becomes increasingly less rewarding prompts the substitution of relational goods with private 
goods in individual preferences, thereby favouring social isolation. Social isolation can be 
interpreted as a particular form of self-defense through which individuals make their utility 
independent from the actions of others. For example, individuals choosing social isolation 
tend to watch a movie alone through a home theatre system instead of going to the cinema 
with friends. They may even prefer to renounce their leisure activities to devote all of the 
available time to work. In this way, their payoffs do not vary with the closing of theatres or 
with the decline in the number (or even the unavailability) of friends with whom to share a 
night at the cinema. This shift in preferences is not driven by mutating tastes. Rather, as 
explained by Hirsch (1976), it must be interpreted as a self-protective reaction to the 
deterioration of the social environment. Hirsch (1976) was the first to introduce the concept of 
defensive consumption choices in his seminal work on the social limits to growth. This kind 
of consumption occurs in response to a change in the physical or social environment: “If the 
environment deteriorates, for example, through dirtier air or more crowded roads, then a shift 
in resources to counter these “bads” does not represent a change in consumer tastes but a 
response, on the basis of existing tastes, to a reduction in net welfare” (Hirsch, 1976, p. 63). 
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3. The rise in SNS-mediated interaction 
In Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) argued that progress in information technology could 
further exacerbate the decline in community life. At the time, Putnam referred to the negative 
role of television and other forms of technology-based entertainment such as video players 
and videogames. Early Internet studies reprised Putnam’s arguments suggesting that the 
Internet might displace even more social activities than television (DiMaggio et al., 2001). 
The displacement hypothesis was supported by the first empirical tests of the relationship 
between Internet use and face-to-face interactions (e.g. Kraut et al., 1998; Nie et al., 2002). 
These explorations, however, were carried out before the rise of SNS, when using the Internet 
was predominantly a solitary activity with limited relational implications. Today, Internet use 
is closely related to engagement in online social networks.  
According to the Pew Research Center (PRC) Internet & American Life Project Survey, as of 
September 2014, 71 per cent of online adults were active on Facebook, 23 per cent used 
Twitter, 28 per cent used Pinterest and 26 per cent used Instagram (Duggan et al., 2015). 
These figures mark a dramatic increase from 2009, when the PRC first began collecting data 
on Internet use. At that time, 46 per cent of online adults had ever used a SNS (Duggan and 
Brenner, 2013). Despite the extent of this transformation, the economic research on online 
networks is limited. In the fields of social psychology and communication science, several 
authors have tackled the potential role of SNS in face-to-face interaction. Ellison et al. (2007) 
studied how Facebook affected social capital and well-being in a sample of undergraduate 
students in an American college. They found a strong association between the use of 
Facebook and aspects of social capital entailing repeated and trust-based interactions with 
family and friends. In a longitudinal follow-up of the study, Steinfield et al. (2009) found that 
Facebook use in year one strongly predicted indicators of bridging social capital outcomes in 
year two. Based on a survey administered to college students recruited from two Texas 
universities, Valenzuela et al. (2013) found positive relationships between the intensity of 
Facebook use and students’ life satisfaction, social trust, civic engagement, and political 
participation. 
In economics, a few studies empirically assessed the role of broadband on aspects of social 
capital and political participation but, due to a lack of data, they could not tackle the possible 
role of online social networks. Based on German Socio-Economic Panel data, Bauernschuster 
et al. (2014) found that having broadband Internet access at home has positive effects on 
individuals’ social interactions, manifesting in a higher frequency of visiting theatres, opera 
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and exhibitions, and in a higher frequency of visiting friends. Using data on Italian 
municipalities, Campante et al. (2013) found that the diffusion of broadband led, initially, to a 
significant decline in electoral turnout in national parliamentary elections. This was reversed 
in the 2013 elections when the first round took place after the explosive rise of SNS. Falck et 
al. (2012) found that the progressive increase in DSL availability significantly decreased voter 
turnout in German municipalities.  
Based on cross-sectional Italian data, Sabatini and Sarracino (2014a) suggested that online 
social networks may be used to preserve and consolidate existing relationships and that the 
use of SNS may play a role in preventing social isolation. The authors argued that the positive 
relationships between broadband availability and aspects of social capital identified in 
previous economic studies might, in fact, be due to the use of online social networks. 
Antoci et al. (2012a; 2012b; 2015) theoretically analysed the evolution of social participation 
and the accumulation of social capital in relation to technological progress and online 
networking. Their results suggest that, under certain conditions, the stock of information and 
social ties accumulated within online networks can create an infrastructure that helps 
individuals to develop their social participation despite space and time constraints. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that face-to-face and SNS-mediated interaction may be 
complementary, rather than one substituting the other. On the other hand, there is evidence 
that, despite the steep rise in the use of SNS, a decreasing yet still remarkable share of online 
adults chooses not to use them (see for example Zickuhr, 2013, for the U.S. and Sabatini and 
Sarracino, 2014a, for Italy). These facts point to the need for modeling a social interaction 
strategy exclusively based on face-to-face encounters and one entailing both face-to-face and 
SNS-mediated interactions. 
 
4. The problem of online incivility 
The rise of SNS-mediated interaction has been accompanied by the emergence of new, 
unexpected, downsides. Anecdotal and descriptive evidence shows that interaction in online 
social networks has increasingly been plagued by online incivility. The PRC reports that 
notable proportions of SNS users do witness bad behavior on those sites. 49% of SNS-using 
adults said they have seen mean or cruel behavior displayed by others at least occasionally, 
and 26% said they have had bad experiences that have caused face-to-face confrontations, 
problems with their family, or troubles at work (Rainie et al., 2012). According to a recent 
survey on online harassment, 73% of adult Internet users have seen someone harassed in some 
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way in SNS, and 40% have personally experienced it. 60% of Internet users said they had 
witnessed someone being called offensive names in SNS, 53% had seen efforts to 
purposefully embarrass someone, 25% had seen someone being physically threatened, and 
24% witnessed someone being harassed for a sustained period of time. “Fully 92% of Internet 
users agreed that the online environment allows people to be more critical of one another, 
compared with their offline experiences. Some 63% thought online environments allow for 
more anonymity than in their offline lives” (Duggan, 2014: p. 1). Women aged 18-24 are 
more likely than others to experience some of the more severe forms of harassment, including 
being called offensive names, stalked, and sexually harassed. 
The roots of incivility in SNS-mediated social interactions have been addressed in a few 
psychological studies, which suggest that, when it comes to the presentation of opposing 
views and opinions, there is a fundamental difference between face-to-face and Internet-
mediated interactions. 
In contrast to online conversations, face-to-face interactions entail the use of expressions, 
smiles, eye contact, tone of voice, gesturing, and other nonverbal behavior that makes it easier 
to correctly perceive the interlocutors’ feelings and intentions. Online conversations, on the 
other hand, are more vulnerable to incomprehension and misunderstandings. In SNS-mediated 
interactions, interlocutors are basically ‘invisible’ and their feelings and sensitivities can 
hardly be perceived. As stated by Kiesler et al. (1984) in an early study on computer-mediated 
communication, “Communicators must imagine their audience, for at a terminal it almost 
seems as though the computer itself is the audience. Messages are depersonalized, inviting 
stronger or more uninhibited text and more assertiveness in return”. Kiesler et al. (1984) 
observed that computer-mediated communication entails anonymity, reduced self-regulation, 
and reduced self-awareness.” The overall weakening of self- or normative regulation might be 
similar to what happens when people become less self-aware and submerged in a group, that 
is, deindividuated” (p. 1126). Deindividuation has in turn been found to be conducive to 
disinhibition and lack of restraint (Diener, 1979). 
As a result, while in physical interactions people usually think twice before behaving 
offensively with a person who expresses an opposing view, SNS users are likely to care less 
about the risk of offending others in online conversations. In a pioneering experiment 
comparing face-to-face and online conversations, Siegel et al. (1983) found that people in 
computer-mediated groups were more aggressive than they were in face-to-face groups. In 
general, they were more responsive to immediate textual cues, more impulsive and assertive, 
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and less bound by precedents set by societal norms of how to behave in groups. Based on 
survey data collected in a big U.S. company, Sproull and Kiesler (1986) found that computer-
mediated communication has substantial deregulating effects and encourages disinhibition in 
respect to non-mediated interactions. 
Further studies suggested that a more impulsive and assertive behavior that does not consider 
the recipients' feelings is far more common in Internet-mediated discussions as compared to 
face-to-face encounters (Lea et al., 1992; Orengo et al., 2010). This phenomenon has been 
conceptualized as “flaming” (Siegel et al., 1986). It refers to the expression of strong and 
uninhibited opinions, consisting of extreme emotional behavior expressed through uninhibited 
speech (insulting, offending, hostile comments, etc.). 
The experimental studies mentioned above were conducted in very limited networks that were 
created ad hoc by researchers. It is reasonable to argue that in large networks such as 
Facebook and Twitter deindividuation and, therefore, disinhibition are likely to be 
exacerbated. Recent studies on Facebook have shown that controversial content was more 
frequent than any prosocial content categories, suggesting that there is an overrepresentation 
of negative content on the platform (Shelton and Skalski, 2014). A further distinctive element 
of interaction in big online networks is that possible reactions to provocative behaviours can 
be easily neutralized, for example by simply switching off the device, or even by ‘blocking’ 
the interlocutor through the network’s privacy settings. These ‘exit options’ probably further 
weaken inhibitions and self-regulation. By contrast, one cannot easily withdraw from an 
unpleasant face-to-face discussion. 
The problem of incivility is important because the infringement of social norms for the polite 
expression of opposing views can provoke emotional and behavioral responses with relevant 
economic and political consequences. 
Mutz and Reeves (2005) experimentally analyzed the impact of incivility in mediated 
communication on trust. The authors noted a fundamental difference between face-to-face and 
television-mediated discussions about political views. Television-mediated presentations of 
opposing opinions often violate face-to-face social norms and easily deviate from civility. 
Mutz and Reeves (2005) collected experimental evidence that witnessing televised incivility 
causes a loss of trust in others. The authors claimed that, when social norms of politeness are 
violated in televised debates, watchers might feel hurt as if they personally experienced the 
offences they saw on TV. Sabatini and Sarracino (2015) argued that when incivility takes 
place in SNS-mediated interactions, users’ feelings might be affected as if the offences where 
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perpetrated in real life. In respect to what may happen with televised incivility, witnessing 
online incivility entails a more intense emotional involvement not only because one can be 
personally targeted with offensive behaviors but also because when others are being offended 
in online environments there is a concrete possibility to intervene in their defense. Based on 
Italian survey data, Sabatini and Sarracino (2014b; 2015) found that SNS users have 
significantly lower levels of trust in strangers, in neighbors, and in institutions than non-users 
and that such a decline in trust may be detrimental for users’ well-being. The use of SNS 
could cause a decline in trust through different mechanisms, some of which have already been 
mentioned: for instance, increased awareness of diversity, experience of new social norms and 
more frequent exposure to incivility as compared to face-to-face interactions.6 
Overall, the evidence regarding online incivility suggests that SNS can easily become a 
hostile environment for users and prompts the need to analyze two different strategies of 
social interaction via SNS, based on the propensity for acting civilly or not.  
 
5. The model 
Let us assume that, in each instant of time t, individuals play a one-shot population game (i.e. 
all individuals play the game simultaneously); they have to choose (ex ante) one of the 
following strategies: 
 
Strategy O: social relations are developed by exclusive means of face-to-face encounters. We 
call this strategy O (for Offline). The distinctive trait of agents playing O is that they do not 
use online social networks.  
Strategy H: social relations are developed both by means of face-to-face interactions and via 
social networking sites. SNS users who choose H (for Hate) behave online in an uncivil way. 
These agents indulge in offensive and disrespectful behaviors, vile comments, online 
harassment, or hate speech. 
Strategy P: agents who follow this strategy develop their social relations both by means of 
face-to-face interactions and via SNS. In contrast to H players, however, P players behave 
politely in online interactions. We call this strategy P (for Polite). 
                                                
6Accordingly, in the model we make the simplifying assumption that people only behave politely when 
interacting offline. On the one hand, the very nature of face-to-face interactions increases the costs of incivility, 
reducing the incentives to behave impolitely offline as compared to the Internet. On the other, given the 
proportion of people adopting each strategy, in each period people interacting online meet more people than 
those who are only offline. 
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The H and P modes of participation entail different degrees of Internet-mediated interaction 
according to individuals’ preferences: in general, we think of SNS users as individuals who 
develop social ties online at their convenience—for example, by staying in touch with friends 
and acquaintances, or interacting with unknown others online—and meet their contacts in 
person whenever they want or have time. 
Strategy N: finally, we assume that individuals can choose to withdraw from social relations 
by reducing them to the minimum, in order to devote all their time to private activities such as 
work or material consumption. We label this strategy as N (for No social participation) and 
we call the equilibrium in which all individuals withdraw from social participation a “social 
poverty trap” (Antoci et al., 2007; 2013; 2015). The withdrawal from social interactions 
modeled with the N strategy may be viewed as a drastic form of adaptation to conditions of 
social decay that make N players’ payoff constant and completely independent from the 
behavior of others.  
Let us indicate by  the shares of individuals adopting strategies O,H, P, 
and N, respectively, at time t. It holds , all i, and , therefore the vector 
 belongs to the three-dimensional simplex S represented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: The three-dimensional simplex S in the space ( )321  , , xxx . The value of 4x  is given by 
the equation 3214 1 xxxx −−−=  and the origin ( )0 ,0 ,0  of the space ( )321  , , xxx  corresponds to 
the vertex Nˆ  of S where 14 =x . In the other vertices Oˆ , Hˆ , Pˆ  all individuals play, 
respectively, strategies O, H, P. 
 
 
For simplicity, we assume that the payoff functions of the strategies O, H and P are linear in 
the variables , , and : 
     
     
     
1x 2x 3x
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While the payoff of the N strategy is constant and, therefore, does not depend on the 
distribution  of strategies: 
     
We assume 0,,, >ηεδα . The strict positivity of η  characterizes N as a self-protective 
strategy: in a context where no one engages in social interactions, Nbecomes the best 
performing strategy. We also assume that the payoff from virtuous social interactions (i.e. 
adopting strategies O or P) is increasing in the proportion of people interacting in such a way 
(α and ε positive). We assume the impact of the diffusion of the “hate” strategy on a polite’s 
payoff is always negative (δ  positive).7 
We instead allow the parameters  and to be either positive or negative. It is not clear, in 
fact, whether haters get more satisfaction when dealing with polite SNS users or by 
confronting with others of the same type. A H player, for example, may find the interaction 
with a polite player who defuses provocations with kindness less rewarding; accordingly, we 
allow H players to even get disutility from the interaction with a polite person. Or, by 
contrast, she may find it harder, and less rewarding, to confront another hater.  
For the sake of simplicity we also assume that individuals who only interact offline (i.e. those 
who choose the O strategy) never meet those who choose the mixed strategies entailing both 
face-to-face and online interaction (the P and the H strategy).8 
The strategic context of the game can be better illustrated by the following payoff matrix: 
 
 
                                                
7 Alternatively, we could assume δ to be negative if an increase in the proportion of haters increases the payoff 
for polite people, given the share of the population using the P strategy. While this can be realistic when γ is 
also negative (so that haters’ payoff is decreasing in the proportion of polite people), it is however harder to 
justify when γ is positive. 
8 Participation in SNS can be considered one of the individual characteristics people share within their social 
network, either through assortative matching in the network itself or increasing similarity over time. It also 
makes sense intuitively: people would probably prefer to have “online experiences” to share if they are 
surrounded by friends who all have Facebook accounts and frequently talk about what happens there. 
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representing the payoffs of an individual playing the O, H, P, and N strategies “against” 
homogeneous populations where all individuals play only one strategy (either O, H, P, or 
N).Notice that: 
1) The population state  -where all individuals play the N 
strategy - is always a (strict) Nash equilibrium. 
2) The population state  -where all individuals play the O 
strategy- is a Nash equilibrium if and only if . 
3) The population state  -where all individuals play the H 
strategy- is a Nash equilibrium if and only if . 
4) The population state  -where all individuals play the P strategy 
- is a Nash equilibrium if and only if . 
5) The pure population states , , , and  can simultaneously be Nash equilibria.  
6) The payoff of each individual in the state  (given by ) is lower than the payoff of each 
individual in the states , , and  (given, respectively, by , , and ) when such 
states are Nash equilibria. 
7) The N strategy is never dominated by the other strategies. The O strategy is dominated by 
the N strategy if , while no dominance relationship can occur between the O and the H 
strategy and between the O and the P strategy. The H strategy is dominated by N if 
, while it is dominated by P if  and . Finally, the P strategy is 
dominated by N if , while it is dominated by H if  and . 
According to a well-known result in evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995), if 
the pure population states , , , and  are Nash equilibria, then they also are (locally) 
attractive stationary states under every payoff-monotonic adoption dynamics of strategies. 
Consequently, in the contexts in which  is not the unique existing Nash equilibrium, the 
adoption dynamics are path dependent in that different stationary states may be reached 
starting from different initial distributions  of strategies.  
The stationary state  can be interpreted as a social poverty trap, in the sense of Antoci et al. 
(2007); that is, as an attractive stationary state where aggregate social participation and 
)1,0,0,0(), , ,(ˆ 4321 == xxxxN
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welfare (measured by payoffs) fall to the lowest possible level with respect to other stationary 
states. 
To focus our analysis on more relevant cases only, we shall study adoption dynamics under 
the assumption that no strategy is dominated by others (see Point 7 above). Such assumption 
requires the following restrictions on parameters’ values: 
, ,      (1) 
either  and  or  and    (2) 
Notice that under condition  (see (1)), the state  -where all 
individuals play the O strategy- is always a Nash equilibrium and, therefore, a locally 
attractive stationary state. So, at least two locally attractive stationary states -  and the social 
poverty trap - exist under every payoff-monotonic adoption dynamics. Furthermore: 
a) In the context in which  and  hold (see (2)), then also the state
 -where all individuals play the P strategy- is a Nash equilibrium 
and a locally attractive stationary state, while the state  -where 
all individuals play the H strategy- may be a Nash equilibrium (this is the case only if ) 
or not. 
b) In the context in which  and  hold (see (2)), then the states and  are 
never Nash equilibria (and, therefore, they are never attractive). As we will see, such a context 
favours the coexistence of the H and the P strategy. Importantly, this context captures an 
interesting set of social scenarios: the first condition, , requires that a H player is more 
negatively affected by interacting with another H player than what would happen to a P 
player, suggesting that (i) haters do not get along with each other, possibly because they get 
no satisfaction in the absence of a proper “victim” and/or are forced to take a taste of their 
own medicine, whereas (ii) polite people are only mildly annoyed by interacting with haters. 
On the other hand, the second condition, , implies that interacting with a P player is 
more satisfactory for a H player than for another P player. Taken together, these conditions 
thus describe a context in which haters have stronger “online passions” than polite 
participants, that is, partner selection is even more crucial for haters than for polite users – 
which seems a plausible characterization of many real-life interaction scenarios.  
ηα > ηε > ηγβ >),max(
δβ −> εγ < δβ −< εγ >
ηα > )0,0,0,1(), , ,(ˆ 4321 == xxxxO
Oˆ
Nˆ
δβ −> εγ <
)0,1,0,0(), , ,(ˆ 4321 == xxxxP
)0,0,1,0(), , ,(ˆ 4321 == xxxxH
ηβ >
δβ −< εγ > Pˆ Hˆ
δβ −<
εγ >
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6. Evolutionary dynamics 
Following Taylor and Yonker (1978), we assume that the diffusion of the four strategies is 
described by the replicator equations: 
 
      (3) 
  
Where dttdxx ii /)(=
•
 represents the time derivative of , i=1,..., 4, and: 
   
is the population-wide average payoff. 
According to replicator equations (3), individuals tend to imitate players who adopt the 
relatively more rewarding strategies. As a consequence, such strategies spread in the 
population at the expenses of the less rewarding ones. 
Replicator dynamics (3) are defined in the three-dimensional simplex: 
 
represented in Figure 1 in the space .9All the pure population states , , , and 
 are stationary states under dynamics (3). Furthermore, the edges of S where one or more 
strategies are adopted by no one are invariant under dynamics (3); that is, every trajectory 
starting from a point belonging to one of the edges, remains in the edge for every time 
. 
                                                
9 The value of  is given by the equation  and the origin  of the space  
corresponds to the point of S where . 
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To analyze replicator dynamics (3), it is useful to take into account the well-known 
correspondence between replicator equations and Lotka-Volterra systems (Hofbauer, 1981). 
In particular, in this case, we have that the transformation: 
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maps the trajectories under Lotka-Volterra equations: 
 
                                              (4) 
 
onto those generated by replicator equations (3). The inverse transformation of T: 
 
 
 
does the opposite. 
Variables y, z, and w respectively measure the ratios between the shares , ,  of 
individuals playing the H, P, and N strategy and the share  of individuals playing the O 
strategy. 
According to system (4), the paths followed by the ratios  and  do not 
depend on the ratio . This implies that the process of diffusion of strategies O, H, 
and P in the sub-population of individuals not adopting the N strategy does not depend on the 
ratio  and is fully described by the trajectories generated by the sub-system of (4):  
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      (5) 
Obviously, the study of system (5) gives information about the ratios between the variables 
,  and the variable , but it does not allow us to get information about the ratio 
 and, therefore, about the ratio between the size of the sub-population of individuals 
choosing to not participate (i.e. playing the N strategy) and the size of the sub-population of 
individuals choosing to participate (i.e. choosing one of the strategies O, H, P). 
6.1.The dynamics of social participation strategies: O, H, and P 
In this section, we analyze system (5). The coordinate change proposed by Hofbauer (1981): 
 
    
maps the trajectories generated by the Lotka-Volterra system (5) onto those generated by the 
replicator equations: 
 
        (6)
             
obtained by posing  in system (3). The inverse transformation of T: 
     
does the opposite. 
System (6) describes the dynamics of system (3) in the two-dimensional edge with  
(where nobody plays the N strategy) of the three-dimensional simplex S represented in Figure 
1. However, since the trajectories of system (6) are associated to the trajectories of the two-
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dimensional Lotka-Volterra system (5) via the coordinate change T, some insights obtained 
from the analysis of (6) can be transferred to (3), as we will show below. 
The analysis of system (6) builds on the classification results in Bomze (1983) and is reported 
in the mathematical appendix. It allows us to give a complete classification of all the possible 
dynamic regimes that may be observed under system (6). These regimes are illustrated in 
Figures 2a-2f. In these and in the following figures, a full dot  represents a locally 
attractive stationary state, an empty dot ○ represents a repulsive stationary state, while a 
saddle point is indicated by drawing its insets and outsets (stable and unstable manifolds, 
respectively). Only some representative trajectories are sketched. The dynamic regimes that 
may be observed in the edge  are the following: 
1) Case  (and therefore ) and . In this case, all the stationary states , , 
and  are locally attractive.10 No other attractive stationary state exists. Figures 2a and 2b 
illustrate, respectively, the sub-cases in which condition: 
 
      (7) 
 
holds and the sub-case in which the opposite of condition (7) holds. They correspond, 
respectively, to phase portraits number 7 and 35 in Bomze’s classification (from now on, we 
shall indicate the phase portrait number # of Bomze's classification with the symbol PP#).11 
To ease interpretation, condition (7) can be also expressed as δεβγ // −> . This inequality 
compares the ratio of marginal return when meeting a polite or a hater for Haters versus 
Polites (abusing terminology, as a sort of Marginal Rate of Substitution of Haters vs. Polites). 
If (7) holds, at the margin the rate at which haters are willing to forgo meeting one hater for 
meeting a Polite is greater than the rate for Polites. 
2) Case  and  (and therefore , by conditions (2)). In this case, only the 
stationary states  and  are locally attractive. Figures 2c and 2d illustrate, respectively, the 
sub-case in which condition (7) and the opposite of condition (7) hold (they correspond, 
respectively, toPP9 and PP37). 
                                                
10 A stationary state may be not attractive for all the trajectories belonging to the simplex S, although it is 
attractive for all the trajectories belonging to an edge of S. 
11 For simplicity, in this classification and in the subsequent ones, we omit consideration of non robust dynamic 
regimes, that is, the regimes observed only if an equality condition on parameters' values holds. 
NS
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3) Case  and  (and therefore , by conditions (2)).12 In this case, the vertex 
is always locally attractive.  
 
Figure 2: The dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge NS  of the simplex S, where the N 
strategy is not played. In the stationary states Oˆ , Hˆ , Pˆ  all individuals play, respectively, strategies O, 
H, P. In these and in the following figures, a full dot •  represents a locally attractive stationary state, an 
empty dot ○ represents a repulsive stationary state, while a saddle point is indicated by drawing its insets 
and outsets. Only some representative trajectories are sketched. 
 
                                                
12 The case  and  is excluded by conditions (2). 
0<β εγ > δβ −<
Oˆ
0>β εγ >
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Furthermore, if the opposite of condition (7) holds, then there also exists another locally 
attractive stationary state lying in the edge of the simplex where only the H and the P 
strategies are played (see Figure 2e, corresponding to PP11), while if condition (7) holds, then 
no other attractive stationary state exists (see Figure 2f, which corresponds to PP36). 
Notice that individuals’ payoffs in the pure population stationary states , , and  are 
given respectively by , , and ; therefore, the stability 
conditions concerning such states (remember that  is always attractive,  is attractive if 
,  is attractive if ) do not allow us to order , , and  in terms of welfare. 
In addition, notice that in the stationary state where only the strategies H and P are played, we 
have ,041 == xx ,1 23 xx −= )/()(:
*
22 γεδβγε −++−== xx , and individuals’ payoff is given 
by: 
 
    (8) 
 
If the stationary state  is attractive, then: 
 
 
 
holds: individuals’ welfare in  is lower than in the (non-attractive) stationary 
state  and higher that in the (non-attractive) stationary state . Finally, the stationary states 
 and  cannot be ordered in terms of welfare, when they are 
both attractive (see Figure 2e). 
As said above, the dynamic regimes illustrated in Figures 2a-2f are those that can be observed 
in the edge with (in correspondence of which, therefore,  holds) of the 
simplex S. However, they also illustrate all the possible evolution paths that can be followed 
in the interior of the simplex S by the shares , , and of the sub-population composed 
by the individuals adopting social participation strategies (O, H, P). Consequently, the 
following insights can be learned from the dynamic regimes illustrated in Figures 2a-2f: 
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a) Under dynamics (3), the shares , , and  always tend to stationary values (and, 
therefore, the share  does it too); this implies that all the trajectories of system (3) tend 
asymptotically to a stationary state. 
b) Attractive stationary states cannot exist where all the social participation strategies O, H, 
and P are adopted. This implies that in attractive stationary states of system (3), at most three 
strategies can coexist (among the available strategies O, H, P, and N) and, therefore, every 
attractive stationary state belongs to one of the edges of the simplex S (where at least one 
strategy is not adopted). Even if some trajectories may tend to a (non-attractive) stationary 
state where four strategies coexist,13 “almost all” the trajectories tend to a stationary state 
belonging to one of the edges of the simplex S.  
Since, according to the considerations above, almost all the trajectories of system (3) tend 
asymptotically to a stationary state belonging to one edge of the simplex S, it is useful to 
analyze the dynamics (3) in the edges of the simplex S. We do this in the following section. 
 
6.2. Dynamics in the edges of the simplex S where the N strategy is played 
In order to avoid a lengthy presentation of our mathematical results, we omit the computations 
for classifying the dynamic regimes that may be observed in the remaining edges , , 
and  of the three-dimensional simplex S where, respectively, strategies O, P, and H are not 
adopted. The procedure allowing us to apply Bomze’s classification to such cases is very 
similar to that developed in the mathematical appendix to analyze the dynamics in the edge 
. 
 
6.2.1.Dynamics in the edge OS  
The dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge (where the O strategy is not 
played) are the following (see Figures 3a-3f): 
                                                
13 Notice that system (4) admits (generically) at most one stationary state  with . At , 
all the four available strategies coexist. The Jacobian matrix of system (4), evaluated at  has one strictly 
positive eigenvalue equal to , while the other two eigenvalues coincide with those of the Jacobian matrix of 
system (5) evaluated at . Since in the dynamic regime showed in Figure 2e the Jacobian matrix of system 
(5) has two eigenvalues of opposite signs, in such a context the Jacobian matrix of system (4), evaluated at 
 has one negative and two positive eighenvalues. Consequently, there exists a one-dimensional stable 
manifold of  and, therefore, there exist trajectories tending asymptotically to the (unstable) stationary 
state . 
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1) Case  (and therefore, by assumption (2), ). We have two sub-cases: 
 1.a) If , then all the stationary states , , and  are locally attractive. No 
other attractive stationary state exists. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the corresponding dynamics 
regimes (respectively, PP7 and PP35). 
 
 
Figure 3: The dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge OS of the simplex S, where the 
O strategy is not played. In the stationary states Hˆ , Pˆ , Nˆ  all individuals play, respectively, 
strategies H, P, N. 
 
εγ < δβ −>
ηβ > Hˆ Pˆ Nˆ
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The regime in Figure 3a is observed if the condition , that 
is: 
 
     (9) 
 
holds. The regime in Figure 3b is observed if the opposite of condition (9) holds. 
 1.b) If , then the stationary states  and  are locally attractive, while  is a 
saddle point. Figure 3c (respectively, 3d) illustrates the dynamic regime occurring if condition 
(9) (respectively, the opposite of(9)) holds. Figures 3c and 3d correspond, respectively, toPP9 
and PP37. 
2) Case  (and therefore, by assumption (2), ). In this case, holds and, 
therefore, . According to these conditions on parameters, the stationary state  is 
locally attractive,  is repulsive and  is a saddle point. If condition (9) holds, then there 
exists another locally attractive stationary state  lying in the edge of the simplex 
where only strategies H and P are played (Figure 3f, which corresponds to PP11). If the 
opposite of condition (9) holds, then  is the unique attractive stationary state and the 
dynamic regime is that illustrated in Figure 3g (corresponding to PP36). 
Notice that condition (9) holds if and only if (see (8)): 
 
 
 
This implies that when the stationary state -where only 
strategies H and P are played- is attractive (see Figure 3e), then individuals’ welfare in 
is higher than in the social poverty trap . 
 
6.2.2.Dynamics in the edge HS  
The dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge (where the H strategy is not 
played) are those illustrated in Figures4a and 4b (corresponding, respectively, to PP7 and 
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PP35). In both regimes, all the stationary states , , and  are locally attractive. No other 
attractive stationary state exists. The regime in Figure 4a is observed if the condition: 
 
      (10) 
 
holds, while that in Figure 4b occurs if the opposite of condition (10) is satisfied. 
 
 
Figure 4: The dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge HS of the simplex S, where the H 
strategy is not played. In the stationary states Oˆ , Pˆ , Nˆ  all individuals play, respectively, 
strategies O, P, N. 
 
 
6.2.3.Dynamics in the edge PS  
The dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge PS (where no one plays the P strategy) 
are the following: 
1) Case . In this case, all the stationary states , , and  are locally attractive. No 
other attractive stationary state exists. Figures 5a and 5b illustrate, respectively, the sub-case 
in which condition: 
 
      (11) 
 
Oˆ Pˆ Nˆ
εα
αε
η
+
<
ηβ > Oˆ Hˆ Nˆ
βα
αβ
η
+
<
 26 
holds and the sub-case in which the opposite of condition (11) holds. They correspond, 
respectively, to PP7 and PP35. 
2) Case . In this case, only the stationary states  and  are locally attractive. Figure 
5c shows the corresponding dynamic regime (PP37). 
 
 
Figure 5: The dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge PS of the simplex S, where the P 
strategy is not played. In the stationary states Oˆ , Hˆ , Nˆ  all individuals play, respectively, 
strategies O, H, N. 
 
Notice that figures 3a-3f illustrate that a bistable dynamic always holds in the edge of the 
simplex joining the stationary states  and , along which only strategies N and P are 
adopted. If the initial share of N players is high enough, then society will converge to the 
social poverty trap  where everyone chooses isolation. On the other hand, if the initial size 
of the population of P players is big enough, then society will reach the equilibrium  where 
people develop social relationships both by means of face-to-face interactions and the use of 
online networks, and SNS-mediated interactions are polite. However, if incivility spreads in 
online interactions, that is, if a positive share of individuals plays the H strategy (this occurs 
ηβ < Oˆ Nˆ
Nˆ Pˆ
Nˆ
Pˆ
 27 
in the interior of the simplexes illustrated in figures 3a-3f), then the equilibrium  where all 
agents behave politely may cease to be attractive (this occurs in the regimes illustrated in 
figures 3e and 3f). Differently from the equilibrium , the equilibrium  where all agents 
play the O strategy –i.e. they do not rely on online networks to develop their social relations– 
is always locally attractive independently of the possible rise of online incivility (see figures 
5a-5c). 
6.3.Dynamic regimes in the simplex S 
Let us remember that “almost all” the trajectories of system (3) approach an attractive 
stationary state belonging to one of the edges , , , and  of the simplex S. 
According to the analysis developed in the preceding two sections, no stationary state where 
three strategies coexist can be attractive under the system (3), in that no stationary state lying 
in the interior of the edges , , , and  is attractive for the trajectories in such 
edges. Only one stationary state where two strategies coexist can be attractive: the stationary 
state , where all individuals play either the H or the P strategy. The other 
stationary states that can be attractive are the pure population states , , , and , where 
all individuals play only one strategy. Obviously, the stationary states , , ,  and 
 are attractive if and only if they are attractive in each of the edges to which 
they belong. The analyses in the preceding sections suggest that we distinguish between two 
cases: the case in which  and  hold and that in which  and  hold 
(see condition (2)). 
 
6.3.1. The case in which δβ −>  and εγ < hold 
In this context, the stationary states , , and are always attractive, while the stationary 
state  is attractive only if . No other attractive stationary state can exist and, 
therefore, almost all the trajectories converge to one of the vertices of the simplex S (see 
Figure 1), where only one strategy is adopted. The payoff of each individual in the state  is 
always lower than in the other attractive stationary states. By the illustrative device adopted in 
Hirshleifer and Martinez Coll (1991), we can represent the edges , , , and  of Sin 
the plane. The simplex S can be imagined as based on the triangle PHO ˆˆˆ −− , while Nˆ  is the 
upper vertex, that in which all strategies are extinct except for N (by drawing the edges in the 
Pˆ
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3-dimensional euclidean space, all the Nˆ  vertices will come together). In Figure 6 we 
illustrate the dynamics in the edges of S in a context in which all the vertices , , , and 
 are attractive. 
 
 
Fig 6: Dynamics in the edges of S in a context in which all the vertices Oˆ , Hˆ , Pˆ , Nˆ  are 
attractive. The edges NS , OS , PS , and HS  of S are represented in the plane. The simplex S can 
be imagined as based on the triangle PHO ˆˆˆ −− , while Nˆ  is the upper vertex, that in which all 
strategies are extinct except for N (by drawing the edges in the 3-dimensional euclidean space, all 
the Nˆ  vertices will come together). 
 
 
6.3.2. The case in which δβ −<  and εγ > hold 
In this context, the stationary states  and  are always attractive, while the stationary states 
and  are never attractive. Furthermore, if condition (9) and the opposite of condition (7) 
hold, that is respectively: 
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then there also exists the attractive stationary state  where all individuals play 
either the H or the P strategy. In this context, we have: 
 
 
 
and therefore individuals’ welfare in  is lower than in the (non-attractive) 
stationary state  and higher that in the (non-attractive) stationary state ; furthermore, the 
welfare in  is higher than in . 
In Figure 7 we illustrate the dynamics in the edges of S in a context in which the vertices  
and , and the coexistence stationary state , are attractive. 
 
 
Figure 7: Dynamics in the edges of S in a context in which the vertices Oˆ  and Nˆ , and the 
coexistence stationary state )0,1,,0(),,,( *2
*
24321 xxxxxx −= (where only strategies H and P are 
played), are attractive. 
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have built an evolutionary game model to study the ecology of online and 
offline social interaction in a society where agents can develop their social relations by means 
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of face-to-face encounters and interaction in online social networks. We have assumed that 
both offline and online social environments can become hostile due to forms of social decay, 
and that individuals can decide to isolate themselves as a self-protective strategy to cope with 
this.  
The analysis of dynamics has shown that the spread of isolating self-protective behaviors 
could lead the economy to non-socially optimal stationary states that are Pareto dominated by 
others. For individuals, self-protective behaviors are rational in that they temporarily provide 
higher payoffs. However, their spread causes a generalized decrease in the payoffs associated 
with each strategy, which, in the long run, leads the economy to non-optimal outcomes.  
Our model has shown that offline and online social decay worsens with the increase in the 
share of the population adopting the self-protective N strategy (entailing the choice of social 
isolation) and impolite H strategy (entailing the adoption of an uncivil behavior in online 
interactions).  
The four pure population stationary states, where all individuals adopt the same strategy, can 
be simultaneously attractive. The destination of dynamics strictly depends on the initial 
distribution of the strategies in the population. This path dependence suggests that societies 
that are similar along a number of fundamental features can converge to different equilibria 
depending on their initial conditions. Given two countries with very similar trends in 
economic fundamentals, the social equilibria they converge to can be very different depending 
on some features of their initial social capital (e.g., attitudes towards peers and propensity to 
withdraw from social interaction) and the mechanisms of diffusion of SNS. This result calls 
for more careful measurement of the different facets of social capital as economic forces that 
might negatively evolve with economic growth, perhaps through technology adoption (as the 
mechanism shown in this paper). 
The social poverty trap is always a locally attractive Nash equilibrium. The stationary states 
entailing positive levels of participation can be attractive depending on the configuration of 
parameters. When this happens, they always give higher payoffs than the social poverty trap. 
The H and the P strategy can coexist when  and . As discussed, this describes a 
situation in which the stakes involved in partner selection are higher for haters than for polite 
participants: when paired with the right partner (i.e., a P player), the hater is better off than 
another polite participant, whereas the former is worse off than the latter when paired with the 
wrong partner (i.e., another H player). Only under these conditions can the shared partner 
preference of H and P players (they both prefer to interact with another polite participant) lead 
δβ −< εγ >
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to a mixed equilibrium with multiple strategies. It is worth noting that such shared preference 
can be present also in other scenarios (i.e., whenever γ > β and ε > −δ), but it is capable of 
supporting the coexistence of the H and P strategy at equilibrium only when the stakes of 
partner selection are higher for haters than for polite participants. This may have relevant 
policy implications: while affecting the negative stakes of partner selection for haters may be 
arduous (since it depends on their own behavior towards each other) and affecting their 
positive stakes is undesirable (making it more enjoyable for them to torment their victims 
would not be a commendable policy), it should be possible to intervene in the stakes of 
partner selection for polite participants. In particular, our results suggest that polite 
participants would be better off by caring less for partner selection, rather than more, since 
politeness can survive as a stable strategy in a world with a fair share of haters only if polite 
people care less about partner selection than haters do. Thus it would seem that Internet users 
engaged with haters need to heed the same advice Virgil gave Dante upon entering Hell: “Let 
us not speak of them, but do thou look and pass on”. 
Nonetheless, policies aimed at modifying individual payoffs might not be sufficient to prevent 
social poverty traps. From an institutional perspective, what could policy makers do to help 
people out of complete isolation and restore social interactions? Should governments 
intervene, or are there market forces that could be leveraged to do so? Antoci, Sacco and 
Vanin (2001) extensively argue for the need for complementary actions between governments 
and civil society. However, this model is pessimistic about the role of civil society; when a 
social trap forms, the whole population converges to the Pure Strategy equilibrium Nˆ , 
without any convenient individual deviation. The dissemination of information on the 
existence of incivility online and the reasons why it can be a serious problem for society 
should be of primary concern for policy makers and SNS users alike. Therefore the 
government should probably enforce policies to prevent defensive self-isolating behaviors 
(e.g., school education on SNS and how to react to incivility) or to re-establish social 
connections (e.g., free public events, public goods with a social component). Future research 
should shed light on these issues.  
  
Mathematical appendix 
It is easy to check that dynamics (6) can be written in the following form (see, e.g., Bomze 
1983): 
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, i=1,2,3   (12) 
 
where x is the vector ,  is the vector of the canonical basis with i-entry equal 
to 1, and the others equal to 0, and A is the payoff matrix: 
 
      
 
It is well-known that dynamics (12) does not change if an arbitrary constant is added to each 
column of A (see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988; p. 126). So we can replace matrix A, in 
equations (7), by the following normalized matrix B with the first row made of zeros: 
 
     
 
We analyze the dynamics in the edge  of the three-dimensional simplex S where the N 
strategy is not played by using Bomze’s classification (1983) for two-dimensional replicator 
dynamic systems. The edge  is a two-dimensional simplex that is invariant under replicator 
equations (3). We assume that parameters' values satisfy conditions (1) and (2), in particular: 
 
 
    (13) 
 
The parameters  and  may be either positive or negative. 
The vertices , , and  of the simplex  correspond to the pure population states: 
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where only strategies O, H, and P are respectively played. We shall indicate by  the 
edge of  joining  and  (where only strategies O and H are present in the population), 
by  the edge joining  and  (where only strategies O and P are present), and by 
 the edge joining  and  (where only strategies H and P are present). By  we 
shall indicate the interior of the simplex , that is the set in which all the strategies O, H, 
and P are played by strictly positive shares of the population. 
In order to apply Bomze's classification, we make use of the same terminology introduced in 
Bomze (1983). By an eigenvalue EV of a stationary state we shall understand an eigenvalue 
of the linearization matrix around that stationary state. The term EV in direction of the vector 
V means that V is an eigenvector corresponding to that EV. 
Let us observe first that the pure population states in which only one strategy is adopted by 
individuals, ,  and , are always stationary states under replicator dynamics. Their 
stability properties are analyzed in the following proposition. For simplicity, the propositions 
in Bomze (1983) will be indicated as B# (so, e.g., B4 is Proposition 4 of Bomze’s paper). 
 
Proposition 1The eigenvalue structure of the stationary states , , and  is the 
following: 
(1) has one eigenvalue with the sign of  in direction of and one 
eigenvalue with the sign of  in direction of . 
(2) has one eigenvalue with the sign of  in direction of  and one 
eigenvalue with the sign of  in direction of . 
(3) has one eigenvalue with the sign of  in direction of  and one 
eigenvalue with the sign of  in direction of . 
Proof. See B1. 
 
Notice that: 1) The stationary state  is always (locally) attractive. 2) The stationary state  
is attractive if , a saddle if and , repulsive if and . 3) The 
stationary state  is attractive if , a saddle if . 
The following proposition concerns the stationary states on the interior of the edges of .  
HO ˆˆ −
NS Oˆ Hˆ
PO ˆˆ − Oˆ Pˆ
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NS
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Oˆ Hˆ Pˆ
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Hˆ β−=− b HO ˆˆ −
δβ −−=− be PH ˆˆ −
Pˆ 0<−=− εf PO ˆˆ −
εγ −=− fc PH ˆˆ −
Oˆ Hˆ
0>β 0<β δβ −> 0<β δβ −<
Pˆ εγ < εγ >
NS
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Proposition 2 
(1) There is one stationary state in the interior of the edge if and only if (iff) 
 (i.e. ), with eigenvalues having the sign of  in direction of 
 and of: 
 
in direction of the interior of . If , then no stationary state exists in the interior of 
. 
(2) There always exists a unique stationary state in the interior of the edge , with 
eigenvalues having the sign of  in direction of  and of: 
 
in direction of the interior of . 
(3) There always exists a unique stationary state in the interior of the edge , with 
eigenvalues having the sign of: 
 
in direction of  and of: 
 
in direction of the interior of . 
 
Proof. Apply B2 and B5 taking into account that, according to assumption (2),  and 
 have the same sign, and  and . 
 
The remaining proposition concerns the stationary states in the interior of , where all the 
strategies O, H, and P coexist.  
 
Proposition 3There is a unique stationary state in  if the expressions: 
     (14) 
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are all either strictly positive or strictly negative. In the remaining cases, there are not 
stationary states in . 
Proof. Apply B6. 
 
Notice that, according to condition (2),  and  have the same sign; furthermore, 
 and  always hold. Consequently, an interior stationary state exists if  
has the same sign of  and . 
According to Propositions 1-3, the dynamic regimes that may be observed in the edge  are 
the following: 
1) Case  (and therefore ) and . In this case, all the vertices , , and  
are attractive. There exist stationary states in the interior of the edges  and , and 
they are saddles with unstable manifolds belonging to the edges; there exists a stationary state 
in the interior of , which is a saddle (with unstable manifold belonging to the edge) if 
 and repulsive if . Finally, the stationary state in  exists if 
. Figures 2a and 2b illustrate, respectively, the case  and the case 
 (they correspond, respectively, to phase portraits number 7 and 35 of Bomze's 
classification). 
2) Case  and  (and therefore , by conditions (2)). In this case, the vertices 
 and  are locally attractive, while  is a saddle point with stable manifold belonging to 
the edge . No stationary state exists in the interior of the edge ; there exists a 
saddle point in the interior of the edge  (with unstable manifold belonging to the edge); 
there exists a stationary state in the interior of , which is a saddle (with unstable 
manifold belonging to the edge) if , while it is repulsive if . Finally, 
the stationary state in  exists if . Figures 2c and 2d illustrate, respectively, 
the case  and the case  (they correspond, respectively, to phase 
portraits number 9 and 37 of Bomze's classification). 
3) Case  and  (and therefore , by conditions (2)).14 In this case, the vertex 
is attractive,  is repulsive and  is a saddle with unstable manifold belonging to the 
edge . No stationary state exists in the interior of the edge ; a repulsive 
                                                
14 The case  and is excluded by conditions (1). 
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stationary state exists in the interior of the edge ; there exists a stationary state in the 
interior of , which is a saddle (with stable manifold belonging to the edge) if 
, while it is attractive if . Finally, the stationary state in  exists 
if  and it is a saddle point. Figures 2e and 2f illustrate, respectively, the case 
 and the case  (they correspond, respectively, to phase portraits 
number 11 and 36 of Bomze's classification). 
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